Circular quantum secret sharing by Deng, Fu-Guo & Long, Hong-Yu Zhou andGui Lu
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
12
01
8v
1 
 3
 D
ec
 2
00
6
Circular quantum secret sharing
Fu-Guo Deng,1,2,3,4∗ Hong-Yu Zhou,1,2,3 and Gui Lu Long4,5 †
1 The Key Laboratory of Beam Technology and Material Modification of Ministry of Education,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
2 Institute of Low Energy Nuclear Physics, and Department of Material Science and Engineering,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
3 Beijing Radiation Center, Beijing 100875, China
4 Key Laboratory For Quantum Information and Measurements of Ministry of Education,
and Department of Physics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
5 Key Laboratory for Atomic and Molecular Nanosciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
(Dated: October 16, 2018)
A circular quantum secret sharing protocol is proposed, which is useful and efficient when one
of the parties of secret sharing is remote to the others who are in adjacent, especially the parties
are more than three. We describe the process of this protocol and discuss its security when the
quantum information carrying is polarized single photons running circularly. It will be shown that
entanglement is not necessary for quantum secret sharing. Moreover, the theoretic efficiency is
improved to approach 100% as almost all the instances can be used for generating the private key,
and each photon can carry one bit of information without quantum storage. It is straightforwardly
to utilize this topological structure to complete quantum secret sharing with multi-level two-particle
entanglement in high capacity securely.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a useful tool in classical secure com-
munication [1, 2]. It can be used to accomplish a special
task. Suppose a president of a bank, Alice wants to send
a secret message to her two agents, Bob and Charlie who
are at a distant place for carrying out a business on her
behalf. Alice cannot determine whether both of them
are honest. There may be at most one dishonest agent
among Bob and Charlie pair, but Alice does not know
who the dishonest one is. She knows that the honest one
will keep the dishonest one from destroying the business
if they coexist in the process of the business. For the se-
curity of the secret message (SA), she will split it into two
pieces, SB and SC , and only sends one to Bob and an-
other to Charlie respectively. The two pieces of message
can be used to reconstruct the secret message SA when
Bob and Charlie collaborate, otherwise none of them can
get any useful information about SA.
Cryptography can be used to complete the task if Alice
created a private key KB (KC) with Bob (Charlie). For
example, if Alice wants to send the message SB to Bob
securely, she can encrypt the message SB with the private
key KB using the one time-pad crypt-system and then
send the ciphertext CB = SB ⊕ KB to Bob, where ⊕
means modulo 2 summation. With the key KB, Bob can
decrypt CB to read out the message SB, but any one
else can not obtain anything about it. Similarly, Alice
can encrypt the message SA with KA = KB ⊕KC , i.e.,
CA = SA ⊕ KA, and then sends the ciphered text CA
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to both of Bob and Charlie. They can get the original
message SA only when they collaborate. In essence, this
is the classical secret sharing whose security depends on
the privacy of the key KB and KC . The distribution of a
private key between two remote parties or multi-parties
is important for secure communication.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important ap-
plication of quantum mechanics within the field of in-
formation, and it provides a secure way for generating
a private key between two remote parties since Ben-
nett and Brassard [3, 4]. The secret sharing has been
generalized to the quantum scenario by using entangle-
ment [2, 5], namely quantum secret sharing (QSS). Dif-
ferent from classical secret sharing, the shared informa-
tion in QSS can be both classical and quantum. In par-
ticular, QSS is useful for creating a private key among
multi-party of secure communications . There have
been many theoretical and experimental interests in QSS
[6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
A pioneering QSS scheme [2], called HBB99 scheme,
was proposed by Hillery, Buzˇek and Berthiaume in 1999
by using three-particle entangled Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) states. In this scheme, the bank presi-
dent, Alice prepares a GHZ triplet state
|ψ〉abc = 1√
2
(|000〉abc + |111〉abc), (1)
where the state |0〉 and |1〉 are two eigenvectors of two-
level quantum system, such as the polarization of single
photons along the z-direction (σz). Alice sends the par-
ticle b and c to Bob and Charlie respectively, and keeps
the particle a. They all agree that they choose randomly
one of the two measuring bases (MBs), σx and σy to
perform the measurement on their particles. When they
all choose σx or one chooses σx and the others choose
2σy, their results are correlated and will be kept for key,
otherwise they discard the results. Its intrinsic efficiency
for qubits ǫq, the ratio of number of valid qubits to the
number of transmitted qubits, is about 50% as half of
the instances will be abandoned. Subsequently, Karls-
son, Koashi and Imoto (KKI) put forward a QSS scheme
[5] with two-photon polarization-entangled states, and its
efficiency ǫq is also 50%.
There is a common feature in the existing QSS proto-
cols, for instance, in Refs. [2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21], that the quantum informa-
tion carrier (QIC) runs only between two parties among
the participants, i.e., from Alice to Bob, and from Alice
to Charlie in three-party secret sharing, no transmission
between Bob and Charlie. In general, Alice is remote to
both Bob and Charlie, and Bob and Charlie are likely
two adjacent agents. Then they can complete a QSS by
making the QIC run a circle, namely, the QIC runs from
Alice to Bob, and then from Bob to Charlie, finally back
to Alice. Though the change in the process seems small,
but it reduces the resource requirement greatly and the
intrinsic efficiency is also increased. In this paper, we
will present a quantum secret sharing protocol of classi-
cal information based on the circular motion idea using
polarized single photons. This basic circular transmission
idea is not restricted to the use of single photons, but also
could be used in other systems and the generalization of
the protocol with entangled states is also presented.
II. CIRCULAR QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
WITH POLARIZED SINGLE PHOTONS
A. The circular-QSS protocol with single photons
The basic idea of the circular-QSS protocol with polar-
ized single photons is shown in Fig.1. The president, Al-
ice prepares the QICs which are polarized single photons
in this QSS protocol, using two sets of measuring basis
(MB) into one of the following four states randomly
{|+ z〉, | − z〉, |+ x〉, | − x〉}, (2)
where
|+ z〉 = |0〉, | − z〉 = |1〉, (3)
|+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), | − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (4)
respectively. The states | ± z〉 and | ± x〉 are the eigen-
states of σz and σx, respectively. Before the quantum
communication, Alice, Bob and Charlie agree that Bob
and Charlie choose randomly the control mode or the
coding mode for the quantum signal received, similar to
the Ping-Pong quantum key distribution scheme in Refs.
[23, 24]. When they choose the control mode, they per-
form single-photon measurement on the signal using one
of the two MBs, σz and σx randomly and record the MBs
and outcomes of the measurements, denoted as RB and
RC respectively. If they choose the coding mode, they
perform randomly one of the two unitary operations, U0
and U1 which represent the bits 0 and 1 respectively, on
the single photon received,
U0 = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (5)
U1 = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|. (6)
The operation U0 is the identity operation and does
nothing on the single photon. The nice feature of the U1
operation is that it flips the state in both measuring basis:
U1 negates the states in the two conjugate MBs[25, 26],
i.e.,
U1|+ z〉 = −| − z〉, U1| − z〉 = |+ z〉, (7)
U1|+ x〉 = | − x〉, U1| − x〉 = −|+ x〉. (8)
Alice
quantum channel
Bob
classical channel
Charlie
FIG. 1: Circular quantum secret sharing. The quantum
information carrier runs from Alice to Bob, then to Charlie,
and finally back to Alice. Bob and Charlie randomly choose
the control mode or the coding mode for each signal. The full
line represents the quantum channel and the dashed line for
classical channel.
For creating the private key KA, Alice sends the quan-
tum signal to Bob first, and Bob chooses the control mode
or the coding mode randomly for each photon. If he
chooses the control mode, Bob performs measurement
on the photon. Otherwise, he codes the photon with the
two unitary operations U0 and U1 chosen randomly and
then sends it to Charlie. Charlie performs the operation
in a way just like Bob. He sends the photon to Alice after
coding with unitary operations if he chooses the coding
mode. Alice performs single-photon measurement on the
photon received with the same MB as she prepares it.
As the two unitary operations U0 and U1 do not change
the MB, Alice can get a deterministic outcome for each
photon returned, e.g., UA = UB⊗UC , where UB and UC
are the operations done by Bob and Charlie on the same
photon respectively, UA is the total operation on photon.
In order to prevent any eavesdropper from getting the
information about the key KA which is represented by
UA when the parties confirm that the whole process of
quantum communication is secure, Alice, Bob and Char-
lie should sample instances twice for analyzing the error
rates. The first sequence of the samples are those that
3have been chosen and measured by Bob or Charlie when
they choose the control mode. It can be divided into
two parts: one contains those measured by Bob, denoted
by s1b; the other contains those measured by Charlie,
say s1c. The second sample sequence are randomly cho-
sen from those instances that returned back to Alice, de-
noted by s2. In this second sample sequence, Bob and
Charlie both choose the coding mode, and hence accord-
ingly their coding operations form two coding sequences
denoted by s2b and s2c.
For analyzing the error rate in samples s1b, Bob pub-
lishes the information about the samples s1b, including
the positions of the measured photons in the photon se-
quence he receives from Alice, the MBs and the results of
the measurements in s1b, and Alice compares it with the
information of these photons. In those cases where Bob
has chosen the same measuring-basis as Alice’s, Alice can
determine the error rate ε
1b
.
The error rate of the sample sequence s1c, denoted
as ε
1c
, can be similarly determined by Alice and Charlie.
But here Charlie first announces the positions of s1c pho-
tons, and then Bob is asked to publish his unitary oper-
ations he performs on these photons, then Bob publishes
the outcome of his measurement and the corresponding
measuring-basis.
To analyze the error rate in the second sample sequence
s2, Alice asks Bob and Charlie to publish the unitary
operations of the sampled photons in the sequence. Since
Alice’s result should be the product of unitary operations
of Alice and Bob, Alice can determine the error rate from
the announcement of Bob and Charlie.
With these eavesdropping checks, eavesdropper will be
detected if he or she has monitored the quantum channel.
The details will be discussed shortly.
In practical, there are noise and loss in the quantum
channel. The methods for error correction and privacy
amplification are necessary for distilling the key KA =
KB ⊕KC , same as QKD [3, 27].
B. Security analysis of the QSS protocol with
single photons
Suppose the dishonest one between Bob and Charlie
is denoted as Bob*. As discussed in Ref. [5], if the dis-
honest one Bob* can be detected by the other two par-
ties, say Alice and Charlie* when he/she eavesdrops the
quantum communication, then any eavesdropper can be
found out. We will discuss the security of this circular
QSS protocol in two cases with Bob* being Bob, and
Charlie respectively.
If Bob* is Bob, the security of this QSS protocol is
simplified to prevent Bob from eavesdropping the secret
key KA. In fact, the task of eavesdropping check is to
determine whether Bob obtained the information about
the unitary operations UC which is just the key KC un-
der ideal condition. Any other cheat done by Bob in the
process of quantum communication will be found out in
secret sharing if Bob cannot get the information about
the UC . The fake information that Bob publishes about
his operations UB on s1c will be exposed as it was an-
nounced before Charlie publishes the MBs and the results
for s1c. In this way, the process for security analysis be-
tween Alice and Charlie is equal to that in BB84 QKD [4],
which is proved unconditionally secure, for example, see-
ing Refs. [28, 29, 30]. We can calculate the information
IB that Bob can obtain about the unitary operations UC
done by Charlie with the probability of being detected ε
B
as follows, in a way similar to those used in Refs. [23, 31].
We discuss the security in the case that any eaves-
dropper can only make individual attacks. The reason
is discussed in Refs. [32, 33, 34, 35]. As discussed in
Ref. [26], the limitation on the error rate introduced by
Bob’s eavesdropping is 25% for which Bob intercepts the
quantum signal Alice sends to Charlie and sends a fake
photon to him. The purpose that Bob eavesdroppers
the quantum signal is to learn more information about it
and introduces as little error as possible into the results.
The error rate introduced by Bob comes from the wrong
MBs chosen, i.e., Alice prepares the quantum signal with
σz, but Bob chooses σx for eavesdropping, or vice versa
[32]. We assume that Alice prepares the quantum states
with σz and Bob with σx for eavesdropping (the condi-
tion that Alice chooses σx and Bob σz is the same for the
security analysis). In this way, the information stolen by
Bob about the state of the photon coded is equal to that
about the operation done by Charlie [23].
The optimal individual attack done by an eavesdropper
can be realized by a unitary operation UE on the photon
[23, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] with an ancilla
whose initial state is |0〉.
UE |0〉|0〉 = |0〉|0〉, (9)
UE |1〉|0〉 = cosφ|1〉|0〉+ sinφ|0〉|1〉, (10)
where φ ∈ [0, pi
4
] characterizes the strength of Eve’s attack
[33].
The probability ε
B
that Bob will be detected is same
as the error rate introduced by the eavesdropping[23, 27].
As Alice makes the photon in the four states {|+ z〉, | −
z〉, |+x〉, |−x〉} with the same probability, then the error
rate is [26, 33]
ε
B
=
1
2
sin2 φ. (11)
The state of the photon that Alice prepares can be
described with a density matrix
ρA =
1
2
|0〉〈0|+ 1
2
|1〉〈1|. (12)
After Bob’s eavesdropping, the joint state ψℑ of the
system ℑ composed of the photon A and the ancilla
[23, 27, 31] P can be written as
ρ
AP
=
1
2
{|00〉〈00|+ cos2 φ|10〉〈10|+ cosφsin∗φ|10〉〈01|
+ sinφcos∗φ|01〉〈10|+ sin2φ|01〉〈01|}, (13)
4where |ij〉 ≡ |i〉A|j〉P , i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The effect of the
unitary operations done by Charlie is just to change the
state of the photon A in ρ
AP
. Suppose the probabilities
that Charlie chooses U0 and U1 are Pc0 and Pc1, respec-
tively. After the coding, the state ψℑ becomes
ρ′
AP
=
1
2
{Pc0|00〉〈00|+ Pc1|10〉〈10|
+ Pc0[cos
2 φ|10〉〈10|+ cosφ sin∗ φ|10〉〈01|
+ sinφ cos∗ φ|01〉〈10|+ sin2 φ|01〉〈01|]
+ Pc1[cos
2 φ|00〉〈00| − cosφsin∗φ|00〉〈11|
− sinφ cos∗ φ|11〉〈00|+ sin2 φ|11〉〈11|]}. (14)
As Bob wants to eavesdrop the quantum communication
for creating a private key, he should send the photon
coded to Alice and only measure the ancilla, which is
different to that for direct communication [23, 31]. We
can trace out the state of the photon A from the joint
state ψℑ with MB σz ({|0〉, |1〉}) to get the state of the
ancilla, ρ′
P
,
ρ′
P
=
1
2
{(1 + cos2φ)|0〉〈0|+ sin2φ|1〉〈1|}, (15)
which can be projected to orthogonal measuring basis
{|0〉, |1〉} (it is one of the best measurements for distilling
the information from the state) and written as
ρ′′
P
=
1
2
(
1 + cos2φ 0
0 sin2φ
)
. (16)
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FIG. 2: The relation between I
B
and ε
B
.
The information IB that Bob can obtain is equal to the
Von Neumann entropy of the state of the ancilla. And
the Von Neumann entropy can be calculate as follows
[26, 27].
I
B
= S(ρ′′
P
) = −Tr(ρ′′
P
log2ρ
′′
P
), (17)
i.e.,
I
B
= S(ρ′′
P
) = −
1∑
i=0
λilog2λi, (18)
where λi (i = 0, 1) are the roots of the characteristic
polynomial det(ρ′′
P
−λI) [23], yielding the two eigenvalues
λ0 =
1
2
(1 + cos2 φ), (19)
λ1 =
1
2
sin2 φ. (20)
So we have
I
B
= 1− 1
2
{(1 + cos2 φ) log2(1 + cos2 φ) + sin2 φ log2 sin2 φ}
= −ε
B
log2εB − (1 − εB ) log2(1− εB ). (21)
The relation between I
B
and ε
B
is shown in Fig.2. It
is shown in the figure that Bob has to face a detection
probability ε
B
> 0 if he wants to gain information I
B
>
0. If I
B
is not small, Bob will be detected, otherwise
Alice and Charlie can distill the key KC with privacy
amplification.
If the Bob* is Charlie, the process of eavesdropping
check for the sample sequence s1b is same as in the BB84-
QKD protocol [4, 28, 29, 30]. The state ρA′′ of the photon
prepared by Alice is random for Charlie as she chooses
randomly one of the two MBs σz and σx for it.
ρ
A′′
=
1
4
|+ z〉〈+z|+ 1
4
| − z〉〈−z|+ 1
4
|+ x〉〈+x|
+
1
4
| − x〉〈−x| = 1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (22)
The operation UB done by Bob on the photon does not
change the character of the state for Charlie as
ρ
A′′′
=
Pb0
4
|+ z〉〈+z|+ Pb1
4
| − z〉〈−z|
+
Pb0
4
| − z〉〈−z|+ Pb1
4
|+ z〉〈+z|
+
Pb0
4
|+ x〉〈+x|+ Pb1
4
| − x〉〈−x|
+
Pb0
4
| − x〉〈−x|+ Pb1
4
|+ x〉〈+x|
=
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
= ρ
A′′
, (23)
where Pb0 and Pb1 are the probabilities that Bob chooses
the unitary operations U0 and U1, respectively. No mat-
ter what quantum signal Charlie eavesdrops, the security
analysis is same as BB84-QKD [4]. So this QSS is secure
if Bob* is Charlie.
Bob* may cheat in the communication, for instance
he publishes a wrong information about his unitary op-
erations UB∗, or he does not use the right key KB∗ in
5secret sharing. Inevitably, his action can be detected.
For example, the wrong information about his unitary
operations will be found out when Alice and Charlie com-
pare the results in s2c∗ in quantum secret sharing. Af-
ter the key KA = KB ⊕ KC is created, the cheat that
Bob* does not use KB∗ for decrypting the ciphered text
CA = SA ⊕ KA can also be detected before the CA is
transmitted. Alice, Bob and Charlie need only determine
whether the key K ′A = K
′
B ⊕ K ′C obtained by combin-
ing Bob’s key and Charlie’s key when they cooperate is
identical to her key KA obtained by Alice’s measurement
before she sends a secret message to her two remote assis-
tants, Bob and Charlie. The process can be achieved by
choosing at random a sufficiently large subset of bits in
the key K ′A to compare the results with those in the key
KA. If the error rate is zero, Alice confirms that there is
no dishonest one in Bob and Charlie pair, and she sends
the secret message to them after encrypting it with the
key KA; otherwise she has to abort the secret message
communication.
The parties encode the photons with unitary opera-
tions and each photon can carry one bit of information
in KA in principle. The efficiency for qubit is improved
to approach 100%. Moreover, they do not exchange the
information about the MBs for almost all the instances,
and they also need not store the single photons.
III. CIRCULAR QUANTUM SECRET
SHARING WITH MULTI-LEVEL
TWO-PARTICLE ENTANGLEMENT
For two-particle quantum system, d-dimension Bell-
basis states in a symmetric quantum channel are [40, 41,
42, 43, 44]
|Ψnm〉 =
∑
j
e2piijn/d|j〉 ⊗ |j +m mod d〉/
√
d, (24)
where n,m = 0, 1, ..., d− 1. The unitary operations
Unm =
∑
j
e2piijn/d|j +m mod d〉〈j| (25)
can transform the Bell-basis state
|Ψ00〉 =
∑
j
|j〉 ⊗ |j〉/
√
d (26)
into the Bell-basis state |Ψnm〉, i.e., Unm|Ψ00〉 = |Ψnm〉.
For two-party communication, one particle can carry
log2 d
2 bits of information while running forth and back.
In a more generalized case, non-symmetric quantum
channel is possible where the two particles of the en-
tangled quantum system have the different dimensions
[44, 45], for example, the first particle has p dimensions
and the second one has q dimensions. Then the capacity
is log2 pq.
The source coding capacity of this circular QSS can be
improved largely with super-dense coding [40, 43, 44] and
quantum state storage [46, 47, 48]. We will generalize
this circular QSS with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
pairs, two-particle maximally entangled states, following
the ideas in dense coding [40]. The case for other multi-
level two-particle entanglement is just the same as it.
An EPR pair can be in one of the four Bell states
[27, 49],
∣∣ψ−〉
HT
=
1√
2
(|0〉H |1〉T − |1〉H |0〉T ), (27)
∣∣ψ+〉
HT
=
1√
2
(|0〉H |1〉T + |1〉H |0〉T ), (28)
∣∣φ−〉
HT
=
1√
2
(|0〉H |0〉T − |1〉H |1〉T ), (29)
∣∣φ+〉
HT
=
1√
2
(|0〉H |0〉T + |1〉H |1〉T ). (30)
The four local unitary operations ULi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) can
transfer the four Bell states into each other.
UL0 = I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| , (31)
UL1 = iσy = |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0| , (32)
UL2 = σx = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| , (33)
UL3 = σz = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| , (34)
i.e.,
I ⊗ UL0|ψ±〉 = |ψ±〉, I ⊗ UL0|φ±〉 = |φ±〉, (35)
I ⊗ UL1|ψ±〉 = |φ∓〉, I ⊗ UL1|φ±〉 = −|ψ∓〉, (36)
I ⊗ UL2|ψ±〉 = |φ±〉, I ⊗ UL2|φ±〉 = |ψ±〉, (37)
I ⊗ UL3|ψ±〉 = −|ψ∓〉, I ⊗ UL3|φ±〉 = |φ∓〉. (38)
The process of this QSS with EPR pairs is similar to
that with single photons discussed above. The president,
Alice prepares the two-particle entangled state |ψ−〉HT ,
and she keeps the particle H and sends the particle T to
Bob first, shown in Fig.1. He chooses the control mode
and the coding mode randomly. When Bob chooses the
coding mode, he performs one of the four unitary opera-
tions ULi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) which represent the bits 00, 01,
10 and 11 respectively, on the particle T randomly. Oth-
erwise, he chooses the two MBs, σz and σx to measure the
particle T , and tells Alice which particle he chooses the
control mode. Alice does the correlated measurement on
the particle H in the EPR pair in which Bob measures
the particle T , that is, Bob tells Alice the position of
the particle and his MB for it, and Alice performs the
measurement with the same MB as Bob on the particle
H .
As for Charlie, after he receives the particle Bob sends
to Charlie after coding with an unitary operation, Charlie
chooses randomly the control mode and the coding mode.
If he chooses the coding mode, he performs randomly one
of the four coding operations and then send the particle
to Alice. When Bob chooses the control mode, he mea-
sures the particle choosing randomly one of the two MBs
σz and σx.
6The eavesdropping check can be adapted here straight-
forwardly. In fact, no matter who the dishonest Bob* is,
the way for checking the security of quantum communi-
cation is same as that for the BBM-QKD [50] which has
been proven unconditionally secure for key generation
[34, 51]. As pointed out by Bechmann-Pasquinucci and
Peres [52], the QKD with multi-level quantum system is
more secure than that with two-level one.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In general, QSS is accomplished with entanglement,
which normally requires more complicated experimental
setups. Though big progress has been made for produc-
ing and measuring entanglement, the efficiency is still low
[53, 54, 55]. QSS with single photons will be more conve-
nient for being implemented in laboratory and practical
application. On the other hand, the source coding ca-
pacity of QSS can be improved largely with super-dense
coding in which entanglement is necessary. With devel-
opment of technology, it is likely feasible to implement
QSS based on entanglement, especially with multi-level
entanglement in high capacity.
Certainly, another important function of QSS is to split
a secret message into n pieces and completes the task of
an m − out − of − n quantum secret splitting scheme,
or so-called (m, n) threshold scheme [5]. Unfortunately,
this circular QSS scheme can not be used to accomplish
the full goal of quantum secret splitting. That is, it can
not be used for m − out − of − n scheme in which any
m parties can reconstruct the secret message when they
collaborate. However, it is useful for accomplish a partial
goal, n−out−of−n scheme. In other words, the circular
QSS can be used to reconstruct the secret message when
all of the other n parties cooperate with some classical
information published by Alice, the president.
In summary, a circular QSS scheme is proposed. It is
useful and efficient when the president Alice is remote
to all her agents, Bobs who are in adjacent, especially
the parties of secret sharing are more than three. In this
scheme, the quantum information carrier, single photons
or entangled particles, will run circularly, and the par-
ties choose randomly the control mode or coding mode
to operate the QIC. They measure the QIC only when
they choose control mode, otherwise, they encode the
QIC with some unitary operations. If the QIC is single
photon, all the parties of communication including Alice
do not need to store the quantum state. If the QIC is
entangled quantum system, only Alice is required to pos-
sess the technique of quantum storage, others need not.
This is convenient for realizing QSS in practical applica-
tion. Moreover, each QIC can be used to carry informa-
tion except for the samples for eavesdropping check, and
classical information exchanged is reduced largely as the
parties need not announce the MBs for the QIC.
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